Last time, I discussed the Schlieffen Plan enacted by Germany in 1914. Though that plan was very flawed from the get go, it working as a 'stop gap' to make a short victorious war for the Central Powers is a prerequisite for the the whole premise of that piece. The changes would follow logically, and the Germans would of course have a reason to seek peace. That is a scenario where the Central Powers can absolutely be seen as the unambiguous winners of the war. This scenario though, well it's one that certainly doesn't have an unambiguous win, but one which can still see a Central Powers victory.
Option 2) Peace of Exhaustion
I have talked about this before, discussing the 'victory' from the German Spring Offensive in another article. However, even that was technically a German defeat as the Entente still had the upper hand at the negotiating table. For this article, I'll be looking at the Entente not having the upper hand, and instead examining a peace of exhaustion. I would highly recommend reading my previous article about the Spring Offensive and victory, as I'll be using a few of the same ideas here, but with a different outcome and series of events.
However, for this all you really need to know is that there are two important differences from our timeline. The first is that in this TL the United States, for whatever reason, chooses not to intervene in the First World War. Without intervention, the Germans are not facing the serious manpower crunch they were facing in 1918 with the Entente now experiencing a windfall of millions of fresh troops coming from North America and their financial system being propped up by American loans. Without American loans, it is questionable that the Entente could have 'borrowed' its way further into 1919 and both sides would have found themselves deeply in the economic red as the year wore on.
That though, is an extremely convoluted and hypothetical economic speculation. I'm not really an expert on it and there's so many competing narratives, whether the US could afford to let the Entente nations, who had borrowed heavily from them, default, whether the Central Powers treasuries could have foot the bill for another year of fighting economically, if the Germans could get supplies from their conquered territories or riches to sustain the war effort, ect; it's a lot of economic speculation, so let's stick with what we know.
Without the imminent threat of American intervention, one can ask whether the Germans would be as compelled to launch their OTL planned "Spring Offensive" to deliver a decisive knock out blow. My own speculation is that, yes, they would want to try and launch one vicious offensive in the spring and summer of 1918 to try and force the remaining Entente powers to the negotiating table. This, potentially, avoids another year of war and another grueling winter. The Entente too, will have no enormous pool of fresh American manpower waiting to replenish their ranks.
For the purposes of this scenario we can speculate that the Germans, in this scenario, manage to take Amiens. This would have been, something of a catastrophe for the British and French. Amiens was the major rail line connecting the two Entente armies, and even though some French forces had been dispatched to the north to support the British, it is debatable they could have managed to keep well supplied had Amiens fallen.
This loss was the nightmare scenario for the men fighting the Germans at this point. Amiens was probably the only true strategic target (besides Hazebrouk) the Germans might have captured in their offensive in 1918. Doing so would have given them an actual strategic advantage that the original attack very significantly failed to produce.
However, like OTL, these German forces would still be exhausted, and to take Amiens they would have, undoubtedly, have had to take more casualties than they did historically. For the purposes of argument let's say that as compared to OTL the Germans lose 180,000 of their best, irreplaceable, troops. That's 20,000 more than OTL, but probably reasonable based on how well Amiens was historically defended. That means that, for follow up operations that are supposed to drive the British back to the Channel ports, they have even fewer troops to attempt it with.
I don't think it's a stretch to imagine that this version of Operation Georgette would be a disaster as well. With fewer men, a desperate British defense, and most likely having to hold off an Entente counter offensive towards Amiens, the Germans simply flail uselessly against the British defences, while by the skin of their teeth holding Amiens.
This will mean that, by May, it has become clear to the Germans that they cannot win a decisive military victory in the West. The Germans would have no chance of taking the vital rail center at Hazebrouk, which supplied the British armies in Flanders, and be facing a possible Entente counterattack over the summer.
Here, much of this scenario does run similar to my piece from back in 2018 which speculates about a naval battle of Terschelling and German attempts at negotiation, but I will add one more speculation. The Entente will, naturally, try one do or die offensive of their own. This waits until the high summer, June and July, to get rolling, giving the Germans time to dig in. Even with their desperate straights, the Germans in their new positions manage to roughly hold their gains, and importantly, still cling to Amiens.
The failure of the Entente counterfactual "Summer Offensive" will signal to both sides that the European War has reached a stalemate. On the global front, the British most likely are stalemated in Mesopotamia and Palestine, having withdrawn troops to the more important fronts in Europe, and otherwise are engaged in chasing Paul von Letto-Vorbeck around German East Africa. Though the Entente is dominant at sea, holding on in France, and still, technically, more economically sound than their Central Powers opponents, both sides will have to face the facts that they can't win a decisive victory.
Enter America, as a peace broker.
Without the Entente driving the Germans to the table, or vice versa, the Germans will have just as many cards to play. Potentially approaching the Americans themselves, the new Austrian Kaiser and the German Kaiser, could play up their desire for peace and ask the United States to act as mediator. This would effectively be a diplomatic coup, which would probably earn German and Austria-Hungary sympathy with Americans and the still powerful German and Central European populations and voting blocs in America. Woodrow Wilson would probably insert himself, somehow, into the peace deal, but at this point the Central Powers can semi-dictate terms.
This then, is what I would imagine:
The German gains in the East, already established by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, are ratified, since there is fundamentally nothing the Entente can do to change that and Russia is embroiled in civil war and not an effective member of the Entente anymore. This means that the Germans split off client states in Poland, the Baltics, and Ukraine to act as satellites in Eastern Europe.
Meanwhile, the Ottomans have been promised all the land they lost in the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War, and without the British to detain them, they have a chance to reclaim some of it. The historic Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic would probably form, then break apart, for similar reasons. The Ottomans may end up seizing much of what becomes Armenia and some of Georgia, and the total outcome depends quite a bit on the outcome of the Russian Civil War.
In the West, the Entente is forced to accept that the Germans now have a say in the government of Belgium. The United States will insist on Belgian territorial integrity, but I have no doubt the Germans will manage to keep Belgium under their thumb diplomatically in exchange for a status quo antebellum on the borders. After four years of bloodshed, not much will have changed on the European frontier.
The Germans though, will lose the totality of their colonial empire in exchange. Despite Lettow-Vorbeck's heroic actions in Africa, this is not enough to prevent the British and French from navally dominating them. Japan controls their Pacific and Asian colonies, and the British take what is left.
The biggest problem though, will be Russia. They are a boil that needs to be lanced. In a scenario with a reasonably intact Germany, the British and Germans will probably manage to get over their anger at one another and support the White Russians in the war, but, the Germans might also get caught up in being bankrupt, and the British too. With the need to keep a lid on their own new Eastern European empire and money and economic problems at home, it's not a stretch to think both Britain and Germany will be too busy gobbling up their own gains, and cash strapped to boot, to support the White Russian forces.
Shorn of Western support, the Whites are crushed like they were in our own history, and the Bolsheviks come to power creating a bit of a truncated USSR.
Technically, the Germans have won World War I. They have lost no territory in the West, gained territory in the East, and are triumphant against Russia, who was considered one of their most dire enemies. They have however, lost their global colonial empire, severely damaged their economy, and now must keep a lid on unrest in the East. Their enemies are not any better off though. The French have buried an entire generation for little gain, the British have enlarged their empire, but are broke and in hoc to the United States, and the Russian Empire is no more. Germanies allies though, are basket cases. The Ottomans have lost their religious ruling mandate to an Arab revolt, the Austro-Hungarians are broke and facing unrest at home, and arguably only Bulgaria has made any gains.
Everyone is broke though, so technically everyone is a loser. The notable exceptions are the United States and Japan.
The 1920s and 1930s will be interesting. An economic downturn is very likely, and unrest across the East most likely unfolds throughout 1919 and well into the 1920s. The Austrian Empire may manage to survive by federating, but it might also go down in flames.
In the East, the Germans will probably face pressure from the new USSR which will try to ignite communistic/nationalistic uprisings against the German puppet governments, and any forces sympathetic to them in the decaying Ottoman Empire. This may, in time, lead to a second war, one maybe supported by vengeful Western powers. Or, maybe, broke and gorging themselves on German colonies the former Entente will let Germany and Russia squabble over central and eastern Europe, only looking to increase their hold and stabilize their own empires. Meanwhile, Japan and the United States will becoming rising powers in the Pacific.
While only technically a German victory, it is still a victory. One of mutual exhaustion to be sure, but one where the Central Powers have, arguably, gained more than they lost.
No comments:
Post a Comment